Download Contract Theory for Wireless Networks by Yanru Zhang, Zhu Han PDF

By Yanru Zhang, Zhu Han

This publication provides theoretical study among instant communications, networking, and economics utilizing the framework of agreement concept. This paintings fills a void within the literature through heavily combining agreement theoretical methods with instant networks layout difficulties. subject matters coated comprise category in agreement conception, gift layout, adversarial choice, and ethical risk. The authors additionally discover incentive mechanisms for device-to-device verbal exchange in mobile networks, insurance coverage for carrier coverage in cloud computing markets with incomplete info, multi-dimensional incentive mechanisms and event established incentive mechanisms in cellular crowdsourcing. monetary purposes comprise financing contracts with antagonistic choice for spectrum buying and selling in cognitive radio networks and complementary funding of infrastructure and repair services in instant community visualization.
This publication deals an invaluable reference for engineers and researchers within the instant conversation neighborhood who search to combine the notions from agreement thought and instant engineering, whereas emphasizing on how agreement concept should be utilized in instant networks. it's also appropriate for advanced-level scholars learning details platforms or communications engineering.

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Proof As the number of users is N in our model, there exist N (N − 1) IC constraints in total. Here, we consider three types of users which follows θi−1 < θi < θi+1 . Then, we have the following two LDICs θi+1 v(Ti+1 ) − Ri+1 ≥ θi+1 v(Ti ) − Ri and θi v(Ti ) − Ri ≥ θi v(Ti−1 ) − Ri−1 . 22) θi+1 v(Ti+1 ) − Ri+1 ≥ θi+1 v(Ti ) − Ri ≥ θi+1 v(Ti−1 ) − Ri−1 . 23) Thus, we have θi+1 v(Ti+1 ) − Ri+1 ≥ θi+1 v(Ti−1 ) − Ri−1 . 24) Therefore, if for type-i UE the LDIC holds, the incentive constraint with respect to type-(i-1) UE holds.

If a type-i UE selects the contract (T j , R j ) intended for type-j UE, the utility that the type-i UE receives is UUE (i) = θi v(T j ) − R j , i, j ∈ {1, · · · , N }, i = j. 8) As we previously discussed, we want to design a contract such that type-i UE would prefer the (Ti , Ri ) contract over all the other options. In other words, a type-i UE receives the maximum utility when selecting contract (Ti , Ri ). The contract is thus known to be as a self-revealing contract if and only if the following constraint is satisfied.

With higher preference toward participation. From the property in monotonicity, we can have the following proposition. 1 As a strictly increasing function of T , the contribution R satisfies the following condition intuitively 0 ≤ R 1 < · · · < Ri < · · · < R N . 1 shows that an incentive compatible contract requires a high performance of UE if it receives a high reward and vice versa. 16) 0 ≤ UUE (1) < · · · < UUE (i) < · · · < UUE (N ). , the two constraints Ti > T j and Ri > R j are imposed together.

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